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Somalia's journey from disaster to resilience a test case for development
The Guardian
December 7, 2012 Markacadeey
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When the UN declared famine in Somalia in July last year, it was a disaster
foretold as there had been plenty of warnings in the lead-up to the crisis.
The first indications that a disaster was looming came as early as December
2010, but the world was slow to react, with NGOs such as Oxfam describing the
international donor response as tardy and inadequate. The subsequent famine
killed tens of thousands of people, but, a year on, the country is slowly
recovering, with a semblance of normality returning to Mogadishu to the extent
that football – once banned by al-Shabaab – is being played again.
Somalia remains fragile with about 3.8 million people in need of life-saving
assistance, out of a population of 9.5 million, and 1.4 million people
internally displaced. Given the country's precarious condition, the UN this week
launched a $1.3bn (£807m) appeal for Somalia for the next three years.
The appeal is a test of the resilience-building approach to managing disaster,
much discussed by humanitarian and development agencies but difficult to put
into practice because of institutional rivalries and the problems of
co-ordination.
"Resilience is simple as a concept but it's such a challenge to the system,"
says Luca Alinovi, who is in charge of the Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO) in Somalia. "It is very difficult to implement."
The $1.3bn appeal will be for 369 humanitarian projects. The FAO, the World Food
Programme (WFP) and the UN children's agency (Unicef) will lead this programme,
which will involve 177 national and international NGOs and other UN agencies
operating in Somalia.
"This is the first time all three agencies have taken such a strong commitment
together," said Alinovi in an interview in London, adding that the three-year
programme marks an attempt to blend humanitarian and development efforts,
breaking with the "linear" thinking on emergencies. "All the current logic is
based on sequencing," he said, with humanitarian agencies moving in first to
deal with an emergency before development workers take over.
In Somalia, however, that approach does not fit the reality where the crisis is
so deep it does not allow people to bounce back. One reason the appeal is for
more than three years, rather than just one, is to provide support over time
that will – it is hoped – enable Somalis to become self-sufficient. "It is a
single strategy, a single concept with all three agencies working on resilience,
and there is zero cost on co-ordination with all our teams realigning
themselves," Alinovi says.
The EU is making its own attempt to bring the humanitarian and development silos
closer with its two flagship resilience initiatives, Supporting Horn of Africa
Resilience (Share) and l'Alliance Globale pour l'Initiative Resilience Sahel (Agir).
Share, launched by the European commission last year with commitments of €270m
(£219m), is designed to improve the opportunities for farming and pastoralist
communities, and the capacity of public services to respond to crises. Agir,
launched in June as the Sahel crisis was taking hold, lays out a roadmap for
better co-ordination of humanitarian and development aid to protect the most
vulnerable people when drought hits again.
The UN's three-year programme for the Horn will involve cash transfers ($78 a
month during the famine), providing agricultural inputs (fertilisers and seeds)
and mass vaccination campaigns for livestock. At least 14 million livestock have
been vaccinated against pestes des petits ruminants (PPR), an acute and highly
contagious viral disease of sheep and goats. The goal is to reach 170,000
households or 1 million people in Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland in three
years.
Alinovi says the UN programme will have to deal with politically charged issues
such as land tenure, disputes between pastoralists and farmers, and overfishing
by foreign vessels as Somalia has no exclusive economic zone around its waters.
There is also the risk that UN agencies, working with NGOs, will set up parallel
structures that compete with a weak, fledgling government.
Another potential problem is whether the region can absorb the flow of cash and
whether it will end up with those it is designed to help. Various techniques
will be introduced such as biometric fingerprinting to ensure the right people
are collecting cash transfers from money vendors. With budgets tight at home,
donor governments want to see value for money, but overzealous monitoring is
expensive, which means less money for Somalis themselves. As Alinovi says: "You
cannot zero the risk, and governments have to accept that."
Some have cautioned against making resilience a new development paradigm.
Christophe Béné, research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, has
argued that resilience is not necessarily pro-poor as there is no direct and
obvious way out of poverty through resilience. Households can be very poor and
very resilient, argues Béné.
Alinovi is well aware of this trap, having wrestled with the question of whether
resilience is a "placebo for people to survive". He believes the $1.3bn could
provide a critical mass in terms of funding for Somalis. "Somalis are
entrepreneurial by nature and if they have enough support for some time, they
can come out of their present situation," he says. "Stability comes from a
willingness by people to share resources, but at the moment they have nothing to
share."
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